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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-3030
________________
FNU SHIERLY; LOTFI HAMLAOUI,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review from an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency Nos. A95-153-146 and A95-153-147)
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 22, 2005
Before: ROTH, MCKEE AND ALDISERT, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed August 18, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM.
Fnu Shierly and her husband, Lotfi Hamlaoui, seek review of a order of the Board
of Immigration Appeals affirming the denial of Shierly’s application for asylum. For the
reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review.

Shierly is a thirty-year-old native and citizen of Indonesia. She entered the United
States on September 11, 2000, with a student visa to attend a university. On November 1,
2001, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a Notice to Appear
in which it charged Shierly as removable for having failed to attend the university, a
condition for maintaining her visa status. The INS issued a separate Notice to Appear to
Hamlaoui, a citizen of Tunisia, charging that he overstayed his visitor visa. Shierly and
Hamlaoui conceded removability, and Shierly applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Hamlaoui did not
apply for relief on his own but sought derivative relief based on his wife’s asylum claim.
Shierly claimed that she is a Christian of Chinese ethnicity and was subjected to
persecution in Indonesia on that basis. In her testimony before the Immigration Judge
(IJ), Shierly stated that when she was eleven years old, a group of ethnic Indonesians
approached her and “groped” her arm. Shierly believed this amounted to persecution
because at times people called her names like “stinking Chinese,” and because she felt
that, as an ethnic Chinese, she “had no freedom to go places” given the harassment by
ethnic Indonesians. At age twenty, while riding in a pedicab, two boys approached
Shierly and touched her on the leg. They remarked upon Shierly’s Chinese ethnicity. In a
third incident that occurred sometime thereafter, and again while riding in a pedicab,
Shierly was allegedly touched in an inappropriate manner by ethnic Indonesians. Then,
on December 9, 1999, an individual passed Shierly on a street in the city of Cilegon and
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exposed himself to her. As Shierly tried to walk away, he pull her hair, but Shierly
managed to elude the individual and he ran off. Shierly’s mother called the police, but
the police took no action. After this incident, Shierly stopped attending a beauty school
out of fear that a similar incident would happen again. She returned home to her family
in Serang. Her father advised her to leave Indonesia, and Shierly decided on the United
States. A month before her departure, a burglary took place at her father’s jewelry store.
Shierly claimed that the burglary was ethnically motivated.
Shierly testified that she fears a return to Indonesia based on her past experiences,
possible future persecution due to her ethnicity and religion, and because of “terrorism.”
The IJ found Shierly’s testimony “basically credible,” but concluded that the incidents
recounted did not amount to persecution. In particular, the IJ found that the three
incidents in which Shierly was touched inappropriately in public places amounted to
lawlessness or street crime, but not persecution. In addition, the IJ found that the incident
of indecent exposure, albeit a traumatic event for Shierly, did not rise to the level of
persecution, and there was no evidence that the act was ethnically motivated. Because
not all offensive or unlawful conduct rises to the level of persecution, the IJ found that
Shierly did not establish a claim for asylum based on past events, and further found that
she failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. Accordingly, the IJ
denied Shierly’s asylum application and Hamlaoui’s derivative application. The IJ also
denied withholding of removal and CAT relief, and permitted voluntary departure.
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After the BIA affirmed without opinion, Shierly and Hamlaoui timely filed a
petition for review in this Court. Because the BIA affirmed without opinion, we review
the IJ’s decision. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).
Shierly challenges the IJ’s denial of her asylum application, claiming, among other
things, that her credible testimony was enough to establish that she suffered past
persecution. Appellant’s Br. at 9-10.1 To establish “past persecution” and entitlement to
asylum, Shierly must show: (1) an incident, or incidents, that constituted persecution; (2)
that occurred on account of one of the statutorily-protected grounds (i.e., race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion); and (3) were
committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to
control. Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2004). Our controlling
definition of persecution is a narrow one– it includes “threats to life, confinement, torture,
and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Fatin
v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, “persecution does not encompass all
treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”
Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240. Whether Shierly qualified for asylum is a factual determination,
which this Court must review under the substantial evidence standard. Shardar v.
Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004). As such, the IJ’s determination must be
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Shierly did not challenge before the BIA the denial of her claims for withholding of
removal and CAT relief, and she does not expressly pursue those claims in her brief
before this Court. Accordingly, we address her asylum claim only.
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upheld unless the evidence of record compels a contrary conclusion. INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
We find ample support for the IJ’s decision. As the IJ determined, the three
incidents of inappropriate touching and the one incident of indecent exposure– whether
viewed individually or collectively– do not amount to persecution under the controlling
law. Cf. Lie v. Ashcroft, — F.3d —, 2005 WL 278694 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2005) (holding
that ethnic Chinese Indonesian’s “account of two isolated criminal acts, perpetrated by
unknown assailants, which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a
minor injury, is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution”). In addition, the
other events Shierly has recounted, such as ethnic slurs and the robbery of her father’s
jewelry store, simply do not meet the definition of persecution as set forth in Fatin. Thus,
the IJ properly denied Shierly’s claim for asylum based on past persecution.
Furthermore, after a review of the record, we are also satisfied that substantial
evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Shierly did not establish a well-founded fear
of future persecution. Cf. Lie, 2005 WL 278694 (finding that petitioner “failed to
establish either that she faces an individualized risk of persecution or that there is a
‘pattern or practice’ of persecution of Chinese Christians in Indonesia”).
For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

